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Stephanie Black’s 2001 documentary film Life and Debt contains 
a striking moment in which Jamaican dairy farmers are seen pouring 
fresh milk onto the ground because it would cost more to preserve the 
milk and ship it to market than it would fetch when it arrived at that 
market. Hundreds of gallons of milk are wasted, in a country that 
suffers from immense poverty, because the price of imported fresh 
and powdered milk had become so cheap that domestic dairy 
production had been rendered economically irrational. This moment of 
film serves as a compelling focal point with and through which to think 
about the notion of scarcity – a concept so central to Sartre’s account 
of human struggle and history in both volumes of the Critique of 
Dialectical Reason. There has been very important work done in the 
English language on Sartre’s Critique (Aronson 1987, Catalano 1986) 
as well as his accounts of violence (Santoni 2003), history (Flynn 
1997), and political struggle (McBride 1991) -all of which are, 
according to Sartre, conditioned by scarcity. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be relatively little sustained discussion of scarcity itself, and 
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what there is retains the fundamental ambiguity at the heart of 
Sartre’s own account. For the sake of a commitment to an engaged 
philosophy, it is crucial that this ambiguity be thoroughly explored.  
This paper is an effort to begin this exploration by opening up a 
dialog within Sartre scholarship about the nature and function of 
scarcity. This is important not only because it will foster a better 
understanding of Sartre’s own views on violence and reciprocity and 
allow for a more rigorous critical assessment of those views, but also 
because it will have an impact on political and economic theory 
generally. I will open with a brief account of the function of scarcity 
within both volumes of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, then provide 
a critical assessment of that account. I will conclude by drawing upon 
some of the resources provided in the Critique to point toward what I 
will argue is a more accurate, and politically positive, account of 
scarcity.  
 
Scarcity in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason  
 
Economic theory at least since Hume and Smith has been 
predicated upon the notion that we live in a world in which resources 
are scarce. There simply are not enough of the things human beings 
want and need in the world to go around. In Hobbesian contract 
theory, it is the lack of resources sufficient to satisfy everyone’s 
desires that makes it rational for any given individual to emerge from 
the state of nature by means of contract—if there were enough of the 
things we desire to satisfy all of our desires, there would be no need to 
constrain one’s immediate interests so as to secure long term benefits 
by means of contract (Hobbes 1985:104-106). The basic mechanisms 
of capitalism (supply and demand, market value, diminishing returns, 
labor costs) all function within a context of scarce resources. As Robert 
Goodin points out, it is “moderate scarcity” which drives the market 
economy – if there were abundance, there would be no need for trade, 
while if there were extreme scarcity, there would be little incentive to 
keep our contracts (Goodin 2001: 204-206). Thus, dominant market 
theories and political structures are all framed by some notion of 
material scarcity.1 So what, exactly, is scarcity, and how does it 
function? Returning to the example of the dairy farmers in Life and 
Debt, what can we say about the scarcity of milk on that farm, in 
Jamaica, and globally?  
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In Being and Nothingness, Sartre saw the desire to be in-and-
for-oneself (the desire to be God) as the engine that drives human 
conflict and struggle (Sartre 1956: 397-400). The look of the other 
compromises my project of being in-and-for-myself, and so conflict will 
arise in an effort to eliminate, or at least dominate, that other. In the 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, however, it is scarcity that drives 
violence and conflict. Sartre states:  
 
Man exists for everyone as non-human man, as an alien 
species. And this does not necessarily mean that conflict is 
already interiorized and lived as a fight for survival. It simply 
means that the mere existence of everyone is defined by 
scarcity as the constant danger of non-existence both for 
another and for everyone. (Sartre 1991a: 130)  
 
It is the reality of scarcity as the “individual relation” and “social 
milieu” (Sartre 1991a: 127n)—the simple fact that “There is not 
enough for everybody” (Sartre 1991a: 128) – that conditions each 
individual’s status as a real threat to each other. Scarcity undermines 
human interaction in a manner that is fundamentally antagonistic. In 
Sartre’s own terms, reciprocity between human beings is corrupted: 
“In pure reciprocity, that which is Other than me is also the same. But 
in reciprocity as modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as anti-
human in so far as this same man appears as radically Other – that is 
to say, as threatening us with death” (Sartre 1991a: 131-132). Thus, 
according to Sartre, the milieu of scarcity, which he later claimed 
“appears as soon as there is animal life” (Schilpp 1981: 13), makes it 
the case that every other organism is a literal threat to any given 
individual’s existence, insofar as each organism is consuming an 
amount of scarce resources necessary for life.  
This in turn means that “scarcity is experienced in practice 
through Manichaean action, and that the ethical takes the form of the 
destructive imperative: evil must be destroyed” (Sartre 1991a: 133). 
Sartre claims further that “In the framework of scarcity, constitutive 
relations are fundamentally antagonistic” (Sartre 1991b: 15), and that 
humanity will be violent until the elimination of scarcity (Sartre 1991a: 
736). We are left with a rather bleak picture. As long as there is 
scarcity, there will be violence, as human beings struggle to secure 
what they can of scarce resources, which security can only come at the 
expense of the insecurity of some other(s). “Struggle”, therefore, “is 
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scarcity as a relationship of men with one another” (Sartre 1991b: 14) 
[emphasis mine]. Scarcity thus stands as a fundamental negation of 
the human (as Anti-Human), which negation in turn invites its own 
negation (counter-violence), by way of praxis directed either toward 
overcoming scarcity, or toward insulating oneself from scarcity at the 
expense of others. Of course, both forms of praxis will, in due course, 
lead to “counter-finalities” and become “altered” such that they will 
inevitably lead to effects which differ, sometimes disastrously, from 
their intended goal.  
For now, two important points need to be made about Sartre’s 
account of scarcity. First, he has a peculiar view about the necessity of 
scarcity. On the one hand, he denies outright that it is a logical or a 
priori necessity (Sartre 1991a: 125; Sartre 1991b: 14-15). Equally 
clearly, he rejects the notion that scarcity is “ontological” (Schilpp 
1981: 13, 31). On the other hand, he states that this particular world 
is definitely one of scarcity, and seems very dubious about the 
possibility of overcoming that scarcity (Sartre 1991a: 127-128; 
Schilpp 1981: 32). Scarcity is thus not an a priori reality (Sartre 
1991a: 125), but the historical (and thus ultimately contingent) 
condition from which humanity emerged (Sartre 1991a: 131). In this 
way scarcity functions as a natural, but not a logical, necessity. Like 
the gravity constant on earth, it could have been otherwise, but it is 
the same for everyone on this planet, and it is beyond our power to 
change it. This account of the inevitability of scarcity will prove 
important for my later critical assessment.  
Second, Sartre claims that scarcity functions as a kind of 
foundation for human struggle (and thus History), but it is not a 
sufficient cause of that struggle. Scarcity exists as a milieu that 
explains human praxis, in that it inevitably (as per the above) 
conditions that praxis, but it does not strictly cause it (Sartre 1991a: 
127). Scarcity thus exists both as a kind of exis, or passive mode of 
Being, in that the material world contains within it the possibility of 
universal destruction, and it is a praxis, or active manifestation of 
freedom, in that we interiorize that scarcity and act it out through 
others and ourselves (and of course, in series being, through ourselves 
as Other). As Sartre states:  
 
I do not claim that the relation of reciprocity ever existed in 
man before the relation of scarcity, man being, after all, the 
historical product of scarcity. But without this human relation of 
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reciprocity the non-human relation of scarcity would not exist. 
Indeed, scarcity, as a univocal relation of each and of all to 
matter, finally becomes an objective social structure of the 
material environment, and in that way its inert finger points to 
every individual as both a cause and a victim of scarcity. (Sartre 
1991a: 131)  
 
In other words, human praxis (freedom) is both the cause and 
consequence of scarcity. It is the cause insofar as our choices and 
actions make use of and even exacerbate scarcity, and it is a 
consequence insofar as our choices and actions are always conditioned 
by and intelligible within a milieu of scarcity. As Joseph Catalano puts 
it: “This world is a world of struggle, because there is not enough for 
all. But it will become clear that this scarcity is also the world as made 
scarce by praxis” (Catalano 1986: 108) [emphasis mine]. Humanity 
(as freedom) is thus intimately bound up with scarcity both at the level 
of praxis and of exis. Echoing Catalano, Thomas Flynn states that 
“Given the fact of scarcity, violence permeates human history. But 
Sartrean violence is always a relation between free, organic praxes 
mediated by ‘worked matter’” (Flynn 1997: 133). Thus, scarcity alone 
does not cause human conflict, we have to choose to engage in 
struggle, but at the same time, within the (de facto universal) milieu 
of scarcity, the choice of conflict “is always being reborn” (Sartre 
1991a: 134).  
Scarcity in Sartre’s Critique ultimately stands as a fundamental 
ground for human interaction, and one that leads ineluctably to 
conflict. Scarcity is not a logical necessity, it is not an a priori given 
(Sartre 1991a: 125, Aronson 1987: 48), but it is contingently a 
universal condition of our facticity, and thus informs all of human 
praxis. That being said, it does not determine our praxis, and Sartre 
would be a poor existentialist indeed if he thought otherwise. Scarcity 
itself may not be chosen, but how we respond to it is chosen— in the 
same way that one is not responsible for being free, but is inescapably 
responsible for the way in which that freedom is made manifest. 
Sartre’s ambiguity regarding scarcity, in other words, can be explained 
in part as a reflection of the inherent metastability of the human 
condition. We are responsible for scarcity—we “create a field of 
scarcity around us” (Schilpp 1981: 31), but at the same time we 
cannot simply will scarcity away, nor can any given individual 
determine on her own how scarcity will impact her life.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Sartre Studies International, Vol 14, No. 2 (Winter 2008): pg. 48-70. DOI. This article is © Berghahn Books and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Berghahn Books does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Berghahn Books. 
6 
 
Before moving on to a critical assessment of this account of 
scarcity, it will be useful to first take a step back and look more closely 
at the roots of scarcity for Sartre, and then to examine the treatments 
of scarcity found in the more important secondary literature. Scarcity, 
in the Critique, emerges originally because human praxis is driven by 
need (Sartre 1991a: 80). This is linked to our status as organic 
subjects, and thus to actual substances necessary for our continued 
survival. But scarcity itself quickly transcends these material 
necessities, and becomes anything that, for a given subject, is lacking. 
Thus, among the examples Sartre employs as manifestations of 
scarcity are such diverse elements as: time, gold, machines, 
technology, knowledge, coal, and even people (either as means to 
accomplish some public works project, or as labor, or as consumers for 
some over-produced product). Thus it is important not to reduce 
scarcity to needs, especially given our capacity, as free subjects, to act 
in ways contrary to organic necessity. That is, it is not biological need 
alone which conditions our actions in this way. We can engage in 
hunger strikes, or carry out suicide missions, for example, both of 
which demonstrate the inability of needs to determine our actions. 
Thus, there is indeed “scarcity on every level and from every point of 
view” (Schilpp 1981: 30), but scarcity alone cannot compel us into 
acts of violence or struggle.  
This does mean, however, that scarcity is extremely ubiquitous. 
It is not merely that there is too little food, or water, or energy, but 
that, given the finitude of resources both material and non-material, 
paired with the infinitude of human desire and the lack that it 
generates, everything can be, and on some level is, scarce. This is 
obvious from the list of examples provided above. If even such things 
as ideas can be scarce (Schilpp 1981: 30), then the traditional focus 
on scarcity of material resources will be insufficient for the Sartrean 
account.2 What this means is that for Sartre, scarcity is effectively the 
air we breathe. Indeed, this is a very telling metaphor, since it rests on 
the idea that air is so abundant. And yet, under the right 
circumstances, air can be quite scarce. Consider someone trapped in a 
mine, or climbing Mt. Everest, or enjoying a ride in Apollo 13 – even 
the paradigmatically abundant has the potential to be scarce under the 
right circumstances. Despite the fact that Sartre clearly includes 
nonmaterial “goods” like ideas and time in his treatment of scarcity, I 
will focus primarily upon material goods, both because they are 
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paradigmatic as examples of the role of scarcity, and also because 
they seem to present the greatest challenge to my ultimate goal, 
which is to argue against the inevitability of conflict within the milieu 
of scarcity.  
Turning now to the secondary literature on scarcity, one finds 
general agreement both on the interpretation of Sartre’s account, and 
the assessment of its shortcomings. Scarcity is understood as 
importantly linked to struggle and violence (Aronson 1987: 75; 
Catalano 1986: 111, 114; Santoni 2003: 34, 65; Flynn 1997: 133; 
McBride 1991: 128) yet at the same time as a contingent and 
historical condition (Aronson 1987: 48, Catalano 1986: 108; McBride 
1991: 109). Flynn summarizes the underlying tension here quite nicely 
when he writes “Scarcity is profoundly historical in nature yet curiously 
a priori in function” (Flynn 1997: 234). Scarcity, in sum, is the 
condition of all human praxis, but is itself conditioned by that praxis 
(Catalano 1986: 109, 116; Flynn 1997: 133). All of this raises two 
important questions. First, what does this tell us about Sartre’s claims 
regarding the apparent practical (if not a priori) inevitability of struggle 
given the milieu of scarcity? Second, can we make any sense of his 
further claims about the possibility (or lack thereof) “a true ‘socialism 
of abundance’” (Flynn 1997: 124)?  
 
Scarcity – A Phenomenological Appraisal  
 
Given his views on scarcity, and its role as the foundation of 
human conflict, it is important to subject Sartre’s account to serious 
critical appraisal. What, exactly, is scarcity, and how plausible is 
Sartre’s understanding of it? As is only fitting given the tradition within 
which Sartre was working, I propose to subject the notion of scarcity 
to phenomenological scrutiny. The phenomenologist cannot succumb 
to the “natural attitude” (Husserl 1991: 33-37) and simply accept as 
given the realty of scarcity and its effects upon human behavior and 
institutions. Rather we must attend carefully and rigorously to the 
experience of scarcity itself as a moment of consciousness. What is 
taking place in the moment (and, as it turns out, one must be critical 
about one’s understanding of a “moment” itself) at which one 
apprehends something as scarce?  
We constitute (Husserl 1991: 53-55) a product, object, idea, 
amount of time, or whatever, as scarce by understanding it in some 
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way as lacking, or at least as “about to be lacking .” By way of 
example, I am sitting in a coffee shop as I write this, and I can find 
scarcity wherever I look.3 Obviously, there is the coffee itself. My mug 
is almost empty. And, since coffee does not exist here in absolute 
abundance, I shall have to pay in order to have my mug refilled. Given 
the work I am doing, the time it takes to do that work, and the length 
of the line at the counter, I am now experiencing a scarcity of time in 
addition to the scarcity of coffee in my mug. There is only so much 
food left in the display cases. There are few tables left open. Even the 
light seems a little dim for reading in most places. This is just the 
surface, however. If I go beyond my immediate experience, there is so 
much more. Scarcity conditions the cost and quality of the labor, and 
the coffee, and the machines that are operated by the laborers to 
produce the coffee. Likewise, the “barista/os” (as labor), the baked 
goods, the ingredients in the baked goods, the fuel consumed in 
shipping the baked goods here, and so on are all conditioned by and 
manifestations of scarcity. Just as is the shop itself in relation to others 
of its kind, both independent and corporate, the demographics of the 
neighborhood it is in, competition from online coffee retailers, weather 
patterns in coffee producing regions, etc. Every instance of scarcity is 
itself conditioned by, and a factor in, other manifestations of scarcity, 
and all of this in turn informs my perception of the coffee in my mug 
as scarce. Scarcity, in short, seems every bit as ubiquitous as Sartre 
suggests.  
One can see from this extended example the give and take of 
praxis and exis. We live in a world in which coffee, for example, will 
grow well, if at all, in only so many places. It is a labor-intensive crop, 
and must ravel quite a long way to be roasted and blended here in 
Wisconsin. It is, in other words, a limited resource. At the same time, 
it is a highly desired commodity, and this is a matter not of some 
inherent biological necessity, nor is it a matter of natural or economic 
laws. It is the result of a complex array of individual choices, each in 
turn influenced by advertising, popular culture, recommendations from 
friends, and the general “coffee culture.”4 Thus, the scarcity of the 
coffee itself cannot be reduced either to the limitations on the resource 
as such, nor to the human praxis that acts within those limitations. Its 
scarcity is, as Sartre suggested, both a cause and a result of the 
interactions of all of these interconnected facets.  
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But things are even more complicated than this. Given that this 
particular shop is also a roastery, and thus stuffed to the rafters with 
bags of coffee, it seems odd that I should think of coffee, in this shop, 
as “scarce.” In order to apprehend the coffee as scarce, it seems I 
need to connect that coffee with the larger coffee market, labor 
factors, processing costs, distribution costs, consumer demand, the 
relative success of this year’s crops, and so on. There seems, in other 
words, to be quite an abundance of coffee in this building, and my 
perception of scarcity is on a fundamental level built not merely upon 
my immediate perception, but rather upon my awareness of and 
connection to the larger world of coffee beyond these walls. 
Furthermore, this particular establishment serves only “Fair Trade” 
certified coffee, which means that the international labor market in 
coffee could tolerate lower wages than these producers are choosing to 
pay. This increases the cost of the coffee, but there seem to be plenty 
of people, including myself, willing to pay a premium for Fair Trade 
coffee. So how scarce, really, is the coffee cooling in the vats, or being 
brewed behind the counter, if we are all choosing to pay more than is 
strictly necessary (in market terms, at least) for our cups of coffee?  
Part of the problem lies in a basic ambiguity in the use and 
meaning of the term “scarce” itself. On the one hand, it can be the 
simple concept of being limited. Anything that is available only in a 
finite amount is in this way scarce. This would be a largely descriptive 
account of scarcity, and would, ultimately, include virtually everything. 
Even air, as mentioned above, is scarce in this way. On the other 
hand, scarcity can imply something more than a mere limit. It can also 
mean that the commodity or product is in fact in relatively short 
supply given some end or purpose. This is a more normative meaning 
contingent upon certain goals and understandings of what is or is not a 
sufficient supply for that goal. Lastly, there is the notion of scarcity 
that points toward the more strictly economic sense of commanding a 
high price. Diamonds are scarce in this sense, but only artificially so. 
Diamond producers make no secret of the vast reserves of diamonds 
that are purposefully kept off the market so as to maintain the value of 
diamonds as a commodity. The phenomenology of scarcity undertaken 
here will need to keep these distinctions in mind, though I will only 
focus here upon the first two.  
In the first, descriptive, sense of the term, to say of any 
material resource that it is scarce is universally true. There is no thing 
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that is in absolutely limitless supply. The second, normative, sense of 
the term is more directly linked to human goals and actions, since the 
scarcity or abundance of a resource will depend on our own needs and 
desires, and, importantly, on the needs and desires of others. Coffee is 
thus always scarce in the first, descriptive sense. Even if the amount 
of coffee in the world were increased by several orders of magnitude, 
it would still not be in strictly limitless supply. The scarcity of coffee in 
the second sense, however, is far more complicated. Imagine the 
manager of this shop leaving for vacation. She inventories the roasted 
and unroasted beans, and decides that there is plenty of coffee to last 
through her absence. Coffee, she decides, is in sufficient supply – she 
need not address any scarcity of coffee before she leaves town. Or 
suppose that she wants to reduce prices to increase sales – the same 
quantity of coffee could now be seen as scarce, given this particular 
goal. Whether the same amount of coffee is scarce in this normative 
sense will depend not only upon the goals of the management of this 
shop, but also on the consumption patterns of the customers. If a new 
medical study reveals that coffee fights cancer, or prevents 
Alzheimer’s disease, or increases sex drive, then what was an 
abundant supply of coffee yesterday might suddenly become a scarce 
supply, even if the amount of coffee in the building remained the 
same.  
This explains some of the complexity involved in the 
apprehension of a product or commodity as scarce. The descriptive 
sense of scarcity, the awareness of the supply as limited, is always 
there, and is in effect a necessary condition for the normative sense of 
scarcity. That is, if there were a limitless supply of something, it would 
be impossible for there to be an amount insufficient for my goals. But 
it does not seem that the descriptive sense of scarcity is a sufficient 
condition for the normative sense. Again, think of oxygen. Oxygen is in 
finite supply. Yet I don’t need to worry about my own consumption (do 
I really have enough left to work-out today?), or that of others in 
relation to my own (by resenting joggers for burning more than their 
fair share, for example). Should I change my goals, however, oxygen 
can become scarce in exactly this way. If I decide to climb Mt. Everest, 
I’ll need to either train my body to make do with less oxygen 
(decrease demand), or ensure that I bring enough extra oxygen with 
me (increase supply). If I find myself trapped with you in a bank vault 
or a mine, I may indeed resent it if you decide it’s time to do jumping 
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jacks. Scarcity in the descriptive sense does indeed appear to be a 
universal condition, but seldom is it what anyone is really concerned 
with. That something is in limited supply only becomes important 
given certain desires and goals within a particular material and social 
setting. The scarcity in the normative sense that emerges in these 
examples with oxygen requires scarcity in the first sense, but the fact 
that there is a finite supply of oxygen normally doesn’t bother us in 
the least.  
I apprehend the coffee in my mug as scarce given both the fact 
that there is but a finite supply of coffee not only in this shop, but 
globally, and the fact that I would like, all things being equal, to have 
more. What is more, given what I know about the demand for coffee 
generally, and my own patterns of consumption, I can recognize the 
scarcity of coffee even when I’m not particularly interested in more at 
this exact moment. It is in this way that the “moment” in which one 
apprehends the scarcity of coffee in fact participates both in a history 
and a future of coffee globally and “for me.” What is crucial to the 
phenomenology of scarcity, and something which Sartre seems to 
have understood clearly, is the extent to which scarcity manifests the 
metastability of the human condition through the interplay of these 
two senses of the scarce. To use Sartre’s terminology, the descriptive 
sense of scarcity is part of our given situation or exis, while the 
normative sense is intimately and inescapably connected to human 
freedom or praxis. This praxis can, at the same time, mitigate, elide, 
exacerbate, or reveal the scarcity found in exis. There is, in other 
words, a dialectical relation between the “brute fact” of a given supply 
of something, and the human activity that confronts that supply. Our 
apprehension of scarcity reflects this dialectic, in that it demonstrates 
an awareness of the amount of a given commodity in relation to our 
own goals, all of which must be understood in relation to the goals and 
actions of others. The investigation of something as simple as a half-
empty (or is it half-full?) coffee mug can, if pursued, reveal this 
dialectic in all of its complexity.  
 
A Critique of Sartre’s Account of Scarcity in the 
Critique  
 
There is a strong sense, then, in which Sartre’s claim that 
scarcity is “a fundamental determination of man” (Sartre 1991a: 138) 
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is correct. The more descriptive meaning of scarcity points toward the 
fact that resources, both material and (some?) non-material, do not 
exist or manifest themselves in perfect abundance. Scarcity is the 
background condition, in this way, of all our actions, insofar as it is 
impossible for us to have at our disposal everything that we could ever 
want. This counterfactual conditional is crucial here, because scarcity 
at this level refers not only to things that we actually want or need at 
the present moment, but even to things that we think might be of 
value or use in a possible future. If I think I have enough water for the 
present, but I believe I could need more tomorrow, or next week, then 
it turns out that I really do not have enough water – I have a scarcity 
of water despite the fact that I have ample supply for my immediate 
needs. All human action, therefore, is informed by the fact that this is 
a world of finite resources, and any given individual’s use of any given 
resource here and now means that there is less of that resource 
available for someone else. And indeed, since so much of our activity 
is directed toward the fulfillment of material and nonmaterial needs 
and desires, that milieu of scarcity is what makes these actions of 
consumption and stockpiling intelligible in the first place.  
Where one might take issue with Sartre’s account is in regards 
to his claims about the ethical implications of the milieu of scarcity. 
Recall that Sartre characterizes scarcity as generating a Manichean 
ethos. As conditioned by scarcity, Sartre tells us, human reciprocity 
causes us to understand the other as “threatening us with death” 
(Sartre 1991a: 132). He states further that “the mere existence of 
everyone is defined by scarcity as the constant danger of non-
existence both for another and for everyone” (Sartre 1991a: 130). 
What all of this in turn means is that “violence must be defined as a 
structure of human action under the sway of Manichaeism and in a 
context of scarcity. Violence always presents itself as counter-violence, 
that is to say, as a retaliation against the violence of the Other” 
(Sartre 1991a: 133). Human violence and conflict is thus driven, in a 
sense, by the engine of scarcity. Indeed, “Struggle is scarcity as a 
relationship of men with one another” (Sartre 1991b: 14). According 
to Sartre, every other individual’s “mere existence” stands, within the 
milieu of scarcity, as a threat to one’s own existence, and this threat 
must ultimately be negated through conflict and violence in 
“Manichean action.”  
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This points toward what is clearly a rather bleak picture, and 
one that, at its heart, shares much more in common with Hobbes than 
a good Sartrean might like to admit. It is an account that seems to 
commit Sartre to the view that violence is inevitable, if not ultimately 
ontologically necessary, until such time as scarcity can be completely 
eliminated (Sartre 1991a: 736). At the same time, given the very 
broad definition of scarcity as simply that which is in finite supply, the 
very notion that scarcity could be overcome seems highly implausible 
to say the least. Nevertheless, the following exchange between Sartre 
and Michael Rybalka is revealing:  
 
R[ybalka]. Do you see a possible end to scarcity?  
Sartre Not at the moment.  
R. And what of the socialism we were talking about last time?  
Sartre It would not lead to the disappearance of scarcity. 
However, it is obvious that at that point ways of dealing 
with scarcity could be sought and found. (Schilpp 1981: 
32)  
 
This finally brings the analysis back to the two questions I posed at the 
end of the first section. How inevitable, really, is struggle and 
violence? Is it possible to “overcome” scarcity at all? Sadly, the 
interview moves on to a discussion of Heidegger at this point, and so 
we are left to wonder. If “the overcoming of some scarcities – lack of 
time or of ideas, for example – seems incompatible with the human 
condition as such” (Flynn 1997: 235), then it would seem that the 
more pessimistic interpretation of Sartre’s view must hold. 
Fortunately, I believe that Sartre does provide the resources for 
coming to some understanding of what this might mean.  
First and foremost, it should be noted that Sartre’s account of 
scarcity as positing “the mere existence of everyone ... as the constant 
danger of non-existence both for another and for everyone” (Sartre 
1991a: 130) seems to conflate what is in fact a rather important 
distinction. My very existence is really only threatened when certain 
particular resources are withheld from me. You threaten me with non-
existence only if you deprive me of such things as food, or water, or 
oxygen, or my livelihood. You do not threaten my existence if you 
deprive me of coffee, or television. In the descriptive sense, all of 
these are examples of scarce resources. They do not exist in sufficient 
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quantity for everyone to get all that they want or need all of the time. 
But to say that they are scarce does not, on its own, entail that their 
lack is a threat to one’s existence. It is a frustration of desire, to be 
sure, and it might be even painful, but that is not the same as being 
life-threatening. Potable water and iPods are both scarce, but being 
deprived of them affects me in radically different ways. The scarcity of 
iPods can be a threat if I earn my livelihood manufacturing or 
marketing them, but the threat here comes not from the scarcity of 
the iPods themselves (which is in fact a necessary condition for me to 
make my livelihood off of them at all), but from the scarcity of other 
goods I secure through my relation to iPods. Equivocating between the 
impact of the scarcity of potable water and iPods trivializes the former 
at the expense of the latter. People for whom drinking water is scarce 
are threatened with death—when my coffee mug gets low, I am 
threatened with inconvenience.  
Thus, on the level of those things necessary for our continued 
survival, Sartre’s claims about the other threatening me with death 
simply by existing may be accurate, but on the level of commodities 
and resources that are in themselves superfluous to survival (like 
coffee and iPods), the idea that scarcity threatens me with non-
existence is simply false. Again, the phenomenology of scarcity is 
telling. To apprehend that something is scarce is not the same as 
apprehending that its lack is a threat to my existence. My constitution 
of the coffee in my mug as scarce does not bring with it any 
awareness of threat. I do not feel the slightest temptation to come to 
blows over the next available refill. Even if all the coffee in the world 
were to be suddenly destroyed, my suffering would be limited to some 
minor caffeine withdrawal headaches. What matters, then, is not the 
scarcity of the thing itself, but one’s relation to that scarce thing. If I 
were a coffee plantation worker in Columbia or Indonesia, then my 
existence could most definitely be threatened by changes in the supply 
of coffee. What is more, as Sartre well knew, scarcity can often be a 
positive boon for a given individual. If I am the owner of a coffee 
plantation in Columbia, then a coffee blight in Indonesia, which would 
increase the scarcity of coffee, and thus raise the price at which I 
could sell my coffee, would thereby make my own plantation more 
profitable. Far from seeing a threat in the scarcity of coffee, I would 
see its scarcity as a personally beneficial development.  
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Perhaps even more telling, it is not at all clear that the scarcity 
even of such organic necessities as oxygen and water necessarily leads 
to a Manichean need to eliminate the other who threatens me with 
their very existence. Let us return to the oxygen example. As the mine 
tunnel collapses and we come to realize that there is no way for us to 
escape, oxygen will suddenly become scarce to me in a way that it 
never has before. Of course, it was always scarce in the sense that 
there was a finite supply, but there was enough for all, and others’ 
increased use of it cost me nothing. But now it is scarce in the sense 
that there is very little of it for my purposes, and if my co-worker Bob 
hyperventilates, he is thereby shortening my lifespan. In short, I am 
trapped in this mine, and now experiencing oxygen as scarce (in the 
normative sense) such that those trapped with me are indeed a threat 
to my continued existence by virtue of their own simple presence in 
the mine with me. What is important about this example is that in 
point of fact, when real miners confront this situation, they do not kill 
each other off in order to increase their individual chances for, or 
duration of, survival. They know perfectly well that eight miners will 
use up the oxygen more quickly than four, which in turn will use it up 
more quickly than one. And yet they do not slaughter each other in a 
Manichean effort to negate the threat posed by the other. This is 
because, as any good existentialist knows, no matter how dire the 
circumstances, it is still up to me how I face them, and no matter how 
vitally necessary the resource for my survival, I may still decide to 
forego it. That is, what all of these examples emphasize once again is 
the importance of human praxis in relation to the milieu of scarcity.  
Praxis operates at every level in the constitution of scarcity. 
Returning to the trapped miners, we have already seen how they may 
choose not to actively seek to negate their fellow miners for the threat 
they pose by consuming scarce oxygen. Praxis also conditioned the 
descriptive scarcity of oxygen in the first place, and the normative 
scarcity of oxygen in the collapsed tunnel. The frequency of mining 
accidents is not a matter of pure chance. Lax safety standards on the 
part of mine owners, managers, and even mining crews, paired with 
weak enforcement and monitoring on the part of state and federal 
regulatory agencies, contributes to the kind of accidents that lead to 
situations such as my example. The scarcity of oxygen for those 
trapped miners is thus conditioned, if not directly caused, by the 
myriad choices and actions by bureaucrats, capitalists, and miners 
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leading up to their predicament. At the same time, the reasons why 
the different companies, agencies, and individuals relate to safety 
standards the way they do has to do with protecting the profitability of 
individual companies and the mining industry as a whole. As we have 
already discussed, market rationale (profit) is all about the control and 
use of scarcity. So we see here the dialectic between praxis and exis at 
work. The background milieu of scarcity makes it “rational” to relax 
safety standards to improve efficiency in the mining process, this 
praxis in turn conditions the scarcity of safety, scarcity of the resource 
being mined, scarcity of job and personal security for the miners, and 
so on. All of this can in turn lead to an increase in mining accidents, 
causing a situation like the example used above, which in turn 
conditions further praxis on the part of the trapped miners. Human 
praxis conditions, and is conditioned by, scarcity – “every individual 
[is] both a cause and a victim of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 131).  
Sartre’s stronger claims that scarcity conditions human 
reciprocity in a way that is fundamentally antagonistic seems dubious 
in light of the importance of praxis in the dialectics of scarcity. Scarcity 
is, to be sure, a fundamental condition of human interaction. When 
scarcity is understood in such a broad manner, so as to include such 
“resources” as time and ideas, then it would seem that for any given 
human action, one could find a reason behind it which points toward 
scarcity of some resource. If, as Sartre held, human action is directed 
toward the negation of a lack, then it would seem that scarcity is in 
some sense a necessary condition for human action itself. That is, if 
we understand any lack in terms of a scarcity, and lack is what drives 
human choice and freedom, then all action can be understood as an 
attempt to address scarcity – it is need. This, in turn, means that if 
there were no scarcity, there would literally be nothing for us to do. 
Aronson makes this very point: “The fantasy that human acts might be 
purer and more rigorous if wholly divorced from need is the opposite 
of the truth: without need we do not even have ‘the dream of acting’” 
(Aronson 1987: 215). Human praxis is thus saturated with scarcity, 
but it does not seem to necessarily follow from this that all praxis must 
be Manichean and directed toward violence and conflict.  
Indeed, as Aronson suggests, if scarcity drives need, and need 
drives praxis, then it is scarcity, in some sense, which makes praxis 
possible at all. But Aronson does not go on to discuss the implications 
of this claim. On the one hand, we must choose how to act in relation 
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to the scarcity we confront in a given situation. Very often this may be 
in exactly the sort of Manichean fashion Sartre describes, but this is 
not always the case. On the other hand, when one looks at those 
manifestations of scarcity that are paradigmatic causes of human 
conflict, one cannot escape the praxis that conditions that scarcity 
from the start. Food production is notoriously inefficient, as is our use 
of land resources in relation to that production. The scarcity of potable 
water is equally problematic, insofar as people insist on living in large 
numbers in places (like Phoenix or Las Vegas) where water is hard to 
come by, and in polluting and wasting what water there is that is 
readily available. For any given scarce resource one can locate at the 
root of any given human conflict, one can find human praxis 
conditioning and even exacerbating that scarcity. Thus, it is at least 
arguable that the resources sufficient to satisfy our most basic needs 
are not, in the normative sense of the term, scarce, even though they 
are certainly finite, and thus scarce in the descriptive sense. To be 
sure, it is this finitude that makes possible and intelligible the use of 
resources as a means for profit, such as through the privatization of 
water supplies, the exportation of “cash crops” to rich countries at the 
expense of growing staple crops domestically, and so on. The truth 
that Sartre did capture in his discussion of scarcity is the idea that 
scarcity is what makes conflict work. One can exploit others, and 
threaten their existence, because important resources are not 
absolutely abundant and easily obtained, but it is not necessary that 
we behave in this way.  
Ultimately, there is always scarcity in the descriptive sense, 
which conditions the human praxis that generates and/or exacerbates 
scarcity in the normative sense. But there is an important difference 
between those of us who exploit that scarcity at the expense of others, 
and those who work toward human flourishing in spite of scarcity. If 
we look seriously at the complexity of causes and effects of scarcity in 
relation to genuine necessities, we will find not some mechanical 
economic or political “law”, but human agency at work. Sartre saw 
scarcity as fundamentally alienating, but again this seems to be more 
a matter of how people act rather than what is or is not simply in the 
world. Scarcity and adversity can bring people into conflict, but it can 
also bring them closer together. Sartre claims that “scarcity is 
experienced in practice through Manichean action” (Sartre 1991a: 
133), and that we will behave violently toward each other “until the 
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elimination of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 736-737), but it is not at all 
clear why this must be so.  
 
Freedom Through Scarcity  
 
Struggle and conflict, as we have seen, “precisely represent the 
manner in which men live scarcity in the perpetual movement to 
transcend it” (Sartre 1991b: 13). The claim has never been that 
scarcity compels us to relate to each other in antagonistic ways, but 
only that scarcity functions as a fundamental condition that renders 
conflict reasonable in a strong sense. At the same time, Sartre does 
seem to claim that scarcity in the descriptive sense of limited capacity 
points toward a world that is ultimately hostile to humanity. He states 
that “conflicts and social struggles as much as individual battles are all 
conditioned by scarcity: negation of man by the Earth being 
interiorized as a negation of man by man” (Sartre 1991b: 13). The 
question that emerges is whether the mere fact that resources are 
finite means that the earth is a “negation of man.” If we bear in mind 
the distinction between what I have referred to as the descriptive and 
normative senses of scarcity, it is not at all obvious that finite 
resources necessitate Manichean struggle as an interiorized expression 
of the earth’s negation of humanity. Resources can be finite, but 
sufficient, provided that human goals and practices are organized in 
such a way that finitude does not entail threat. If one accepts the idea 
that scarcity is as much a result of human praxis as it is a cause of it, 
then a space is opened up in which that praxis can work with scarcity 
instead of against it.  
Sartre argues that within the milieu of scarcity human praxis 
must ultimately take a Manichean turn, leading to violent struggle 
against others who pose a threat by their very existence. Against this 
view, I have offered two arguments. First, that there is a confusion 
here between two senses of scarcity that in turn leads to a 
misunderstanding about what is or is not a threat. Your existence 
threatens mine only if your consumption of resources literally deprives 
me of the means of my continued existence. Within a market economy 
this can indeed be quite common, but this says as much about the 
functioning of the market economy as it does about descriptively 
scarce resources. Second, since it is the case that instances of real 
threat need not lead to violent struggle and that such instances of real 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Sartre Studies International, Vol 14, No. 2 (Winter 2008): pg. 48-70. DOI. This article is © Berghahn Books and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Berghahn Books does not grant permission for 
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Berghahn Books. 
19 
 
threat are often deeply conditioned by praxis, as in the example of 
trapped minors and lax safety standards, claims that violent conflict is 
inevitable just seem inconsistent with the existential phenomenological 
ontology that informs the Critique of Dialectical Reason. If one 
interprets this text as in some sense a response to the excesses of 
Being and Nothingness in terms of the “radicality” of human freedom, 
it would seem that Sartre is over-stating his case. That is, in 
attempting to emphasize the important ways in which exis or facticity 
conditions praxis or transcendence at a fundamental level, and thus 
counteracting what seem to be the solipsistic ontological tendencies of 
his earlier work, Sartre goes too far, and portrays praxis as 
determined, as opposed to conditioned, by exis, at least as it relates to 
scarcity.5  
Sartre is surely right that scarcity is fundamental to the human 
condition. Indeed, I have suggested above that insofar as human 
praxis is directed toward the negation of some lack, it is scarcity, in 
the broadest sense of the term, that is at the root of every instance of 
human action – without scarcity, there would be nothing for us to do. 
What this means is that rather than seeing the elimination of scarcity 
as necessary for the overcoming of human conflict and violence, such 
an elimination—which Sartre rightly saw as practically, if not logically, 
– 64 – Michael J. Monahan impossible—would in fact make humanity, 
as freedom, impossible. Humanity truly is both the cause, and the 
consequence, of scarcity, and the symbiotic aspects of that relation 
cannot be underestimated. It is true, therefore, that human beings 
must struggle against scarcity, but not qua scarcity. We need not 
struggle against scarcity as finitude, which would be quixotic at best, 
but rather we must struggle against scarcity as threat. Sartre, echoing 
liberal social contract theory, proclaims that there is not enough for 
everyone, but not enough for everyone to do what? Not enough for 
everyone to survive? Or not enough for everyone to have all that they 
could desire? He is clearly correct if we assume the latter, but it is not 
at all obvious if we take the former interpretation. It is a question, in 
other words, not just of how much there is in the world at any given 
time, but also a question of how much we need, how much we desire, 
and what we are doing to address those needs and desires. Scarcity in 
the normative sense, which is the sense that points toward threat, is 
contingent upon human ends – there is not enough for some goal or 
desire. The struggle against scarcity in that sense, then, is a struggle 
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to take control not only of the resources we need, but over our desires 
themselves. This must take place in a context in which resources are 
finite, to be sure, but if our goals and desires are more modest, finite 
resources might well still be sufficient.  
Another implication of this analysis is that we need to reconsider 
the goal toward which we are aiming. Sartre may refer to the 
“elimination of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 736-7) or the “transcendence” 
of scarcity (Sartre 1991a: 137), but I have suggested that, given the 
relation between scarcity, need, and practice, this may not be 
desirable even if it were possible. McBride suggests that “the idea of a 
potential overcoming of scarcity might prove useful as a sort of 
limiting- concept, an asymptotically approachable goal against which 
genuinely possible historical change for the better could be measured” 
(McBride 1991: 110), but this still takes the ideal of a scarcity-free 
world as valuable (or at least “useful”). I submit that the 
“transcendence” of scarcity should never be understood as an end-
state to be achieved or even asymptotically approached, but rather in-
itself as a constant and ongoing process in which we must be 
continually engaged – freedom is only manifest in a struggle with and 
through scarcity, it is not some end goal to be achieved (or 
approached) by the elimination of scarcity. Likewise, in his discussion 
of reciprocity in Sartre’s Critique, Catalano makes the following 
observation: “This spiral unfolding of praxis never achieves synthesis 
in a Hegelian sense, because praxis takes place within a milieu of 
scarcity” (Catalano 1986: 144). I have argued elsewhere (Monahan 
2006: 411-413) that this is a deep misunderstanding of Hegelian 
dialectic precisely insofar as it treats the supersession (Aufhebung) of 
the terms of the dialectic as an end state, rather than an ongoing 
process. The dialectic of scarcity as both a condition of and as 
conditioned by human praxis will never reach some particular point or 
moment at which it is “transcended” or resolved, and any view of 
liberation which holds this as an ideal must be abandoned.  
Fortunately, Sartre provides conceptual resources that are, I 
submit, invaluable in correcting the weaknesses in his account of 
scarcity and its relation to praxis. Foremost among these is his account 
of group praxis itself. Recall that the originary moment of group praxis 
for Sartre, the “fusing group”, arises out of a negation of some threat 
(negation of a negation). To be sure, threats may take many forms, 
but one of them, certainly, is scarcity. Indeed, early in his discussion 
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of fused groups, Sartre uses famine as an example of a negation 
leading to a fusing group (Sartre 1991a: 350). As he states:  
 
… the group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or common 
danger and defines itself by the common objective which 
determines its common praxis. Yet neither common need, nor 
common praxis, nor common objectives can define a community 
unless it makes itself into a community by feeling individual 
need as common need, and by projecting itself, in the internal 
unification of a common integration, towards objectives which it 
produces as common (Sartre 1991a: 350).  
 
This passage makes clear the way in which a threat or negation need 
not drive individuals into a Manichean free-for-all, but may (though 
surely contingently) provide an avenue for the emergence of group 
praxis. The “common objective” of confronting and negating the threat 
posed by scarcity6 can thus serve in effect as an organizing medium 
for group praxis, which, in turn, is a manifestation of (mediated) 
reciprocity (Sartre 1991a: 392, 419).  
Of course, Sartre reminds us repeatedly that the milieu of 
scarcity, as a manifestation of alterity, is always exerting itself as an 
inertial force driving us back toward series-being. But, as I have 
stressed above, the very idea that scarcity must be overcome in some 
definite, terminal sense needs to be abandoned. Groups, and their 
response to the threats that engender them, must always be 
understood as in process, and never as a complete, finished product. 
As Sartre states: “…we can in fact define the group as a perpetual 
reshaping of itself, in accordance with objectives, with exterior 
exchanges and with internal imbalances” (Sartre 1991a: 407). What is 
crucial is that the possibility of forming a common project around the 
negation of scarcity is always a possibility, and the presumption of its 
impossibility can only ever serve to undermine that possibility. The 
question is whether we will begin seeing scarcity in the descriptive 
sense as an opportunity to organize group praxis directed toward the 
control and satisfaction of human goals within that context of scarcity, 
or continue to understand it as a threat which drives us into 
solipsistic/atomistic relations of reciprocal hostility and competition. To 
see the outcome of this dilemma as pre-determined is simply 
inconsistent with existential phenomenology. The problem, therefore, 
is not one of scarcity as such, but rather is about those who take 
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advantage of scarcity to exploit and oppress other human beings. At 
the same time, we must not aim toward some end state beyond 
scarcity, but rather we must strive consistently and self-critically to 
realize human freedom and positive reciprocity within and even 
through a milieu of scarcity.  
So what, ultimately, can we make of the Jamaican dairy farmers 
who destroy their product? Insofar as market forces made their action 
economically rational, and market forces function as they do because 
of scarcity, we can say that it is scarcity that conditions their actions. 
But this is not simply a matter of the finitude of the milk supply in 
Jamaica, or even globally. It is ultimately a matter of the ends toward 
which the human praxis involved in the production, distribution, and 
sales of dairy products is directed within a context of finite resources. 
And the ends here, first and foremost, are profit. That is not an 
inevitability. If the goals of dairy production were the provision of food 
to those who need it, it is not at all clear that dairy would need to be 
scarce in the normative sense. By recognizing the inevitability of 
scarcity in the descriptive sense, and then conflating it with scarcity in 
the normative sense, it can be made to appear that the struggle for 
scarce resources is an inevitability of the human condition. For any 
given individual working solipsistically to satisfy her every desire, this 
account would seem accurate. But Sartre rejects this ontology, and 
offers a way to see the challenges posed by scarcity not as a threat to 
individual existence, but as an opportunity for relations of reciprocity 
directed toward the shared project of doing the best we can, rather 
than the best I can, with the resources available to us. That resources 
are scarce is not up to us, but how we confront that scarcity is.  
I do not think this is an easy or simple problem to deal with. 
Part of the beauty of Sartre’s discussion of scarcity is the way in which 
he draws out its complexity. Much work remains to be done here. How 
should we frame the project of the management of scarcity? What 
might the criteria or desiderata for success look like, given the 
rejection of the ultimate “overcoming” of scarcity as an end-state in 
lieu of an ongoing process of self-critical confrontation with scarcity as 
a goal? What are the best means for achieving this goal, once it is 
taken up? Again, my purpose here is not to settle these issues, but to 
open a discussion of them. If the possibility for human praxis exists 
that avoids Manichean conflict in spite of scarcity, then there is a real 
need for elaborating the ways and means of that praxis. I have argued 
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for that possibility. It is now our collective task to point toward ways to 
make it reality.  
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Notes  
 
1. Marx’s treatment of scarcity is somewhat different, rather complicated, and 
in any event beyond the scope of this paper.  
2. Indeed, even scarcity itself can become scarce within a market economy, a 
phenomenon typically referred to as “overproduction” (Sartre 1991a: 
138-139). Within the milieu of scarcity, according to Sartre, each 
individual becomes a “man [sic] of scarcity” (Sartre 1991a: 131), who, 
in “seeking his abundance, seeks it as a determination of scarcity. Not 
abundance for all, but his own, hence the deprivation of all” (Sartre 
1991b: 421). Value itself is a function of scarcity, and thus in order to 
secure the value of one’s possessions, or at least preserve it, one must 
ensure that others do not acquire it. In other words, one must protect 
the scarcity of precious resources, for if that scarcity should itself 
become scarce, then the value of one’s resources is threatened.  
3. I am well aware that this is a clichéd example, especially in a paper on 
Sartre. Nevertheless, it is true, and it yields particularly rich material 
for phenomenological investigation. And so I will refrain from conjuring 
some less tried and true example for the sake of originality, and stick 
with the tired, worn, and yet eminently serviceable café example.  
4. The influence of this coffee culture on its scarcity cannot be 
underestimated. As a graduate student, I had several colleagues who 
deliberately cultivated a taste for coffee precisely because meetings 
with students, professors, and peers inevitably took place in coffee 
shops. They felt that it would be odd for them to meet in coffee shops 
and not drink coffee, so they basically taught themselves to like it. 
Thus, their consumption of coffee, and in turn their contribution to its 
scarcity, is a result of a deliberate choice predicated upon the choices 
and actions of others. It is because so many others consume coffee so 
frequently that they became coffee consumers themselves.  
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5. I offer this more in the spirit of a suggestion, rather than as a full 
argument, which would be beyond the scope of this essay.  
6. Here again the distinction between the normative and descriptive senses of 
scarcity is critical. One may, at least temporarily, negate scarcity in 
the normative sense, but not in the descriptive sense. That is, we can 
see to it that supply is increased so that it is adequate to our need, or 
we may find another way to satisfy that need, or we may work 
together to reduce the need itself, but we cannot create a limitless 
supply.  
 
  
